BOOK REVIEWS
THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW. By John Chipman Gray. New
York: Columbia University Press.
This work, as its name indicates, is divided into two parts. Part
I deals with the nature of the Law, Part II with the sources of the
Law.
There are, says the author, three ways of approaching the Law.
The historical, the systematic or analytic, and the deontological or
ethical.
It is his purpose to follow the systematic method and to call attention to the analysis and relations of some fundamental legal ideas,
rather than to tell their history or prophesy their further development.
Having devoted a chapter to the subject of legal rights and duties,
another to legal persons, and a third to the state, the author proceeds to an analysis of the Law of a state, which he defines as "the
rules which the courts, that is, the judicial organs of that body, lay
down for the determination of legal rights and duties." Law, he
says, is not a command of the sovereign, as Austin would have us
believe, nor is the foundation of law to be found in the common
consciousness of the people, where Savigny found it. Nor yet is it
true that the Judges merely state what has been pre-existent as Law.
Again it is inaccurate to say that the Judges discover the Law as a
scientist discovers laws of nature, and that a Judge may make a
mistake just as Newton did, for the "difference between the Judges
and Sir Isaac is that a mistake by Sir Isaac in calculating the orbit
of the earth would not send it spinning round the sun with an
increased velocity; his answer to the problem would be simply wrong:
while if the Judges, in investigating the reasons on which the Law
should be based, come to a wrong result, and give forth a rule which
is discordant with the eternal verities, it is none the less Law."
With this as his conception of the Law, the author easily arrives at
the conclusion that international law is not Law in the proper sense
when used to designate the rules applied by the Judges of any sovereign state. Such rules are part of the law of that state, but rules
applied by a court established by the nations as a result of the organization of such nations would be Law in the proper sense.
Before passing to the second part of the book a word mu-.t be
said of the chapter on jurisprudence. Jurisprudence, he says, is the
science of law. There are three kinds of jurisprudence, particular
jurisprudence, comparative jurisprudence, and general jurisprudence.
Particular jurisprudence considers the Law of a particular people.
Comparative jurisprudence is the comparison of the Laws of two or
more peoples, and general jurisprudence is the comparison of all the
legal systems of the world. As there are many legal systems which
are practically unknown to us, general jurisprudence as a science
based on observation does not yet exist.
It might be supposed that from his theory of the Law Professor
Gray would deny that the deontological element enters int6 the science
of jurisprudence. But on the contrary, he tells us that particular
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jurisprudence is not limited in its subject matter to the rules which
have been actually applied by the courts, but it considers also what
the law should be in cases where no rule exists. As soon as a rule
is declared on a given point, the question of what the law on that
subject should be ceases to be a subject of jurisprudence and becomes
a question for the science of legislation. The same principle is applicable to comparative jurisprudence. If we are comparing two legal
systems, the question of what the Law ought to be on any given point
is proper unless the matter is definitely settled in both jurisdictions;
then the question of what the Law ought to be is no longer appropriate.
Having defined the Law as the rules laid down by the courts the
author proceeds to consider the sources of the Law.
The sources of the Law are statutes, judicial precedents, the
opinions of experts, custom, morality and equity.
Statutes are merely sources and not the Law itself. In other words,
statutes are not rules applied by the courts, but a source from which
the courts get their rules. The reason for this position is that the
meaning of a statute depends on interpretation, and it is with the
meaning declared by the courts, and with that meaning alone, that
they are imposed on the community as Law.
The position that judicial precedents are sources of the Law leads
the author to the refutation of the theory that precedents are
merely evidence of what the Law is. Does such a theory agree with
the facts? he asks. What was the Law as to executory devises before
the decision in Pells v. Brown? The advocates of the theory that a
decision is only evidence of the Law would say the validity of executory devises existed by custom prior to the decision. "But since custom is what is generally practiced in a community, and believed by
the community generally to be a proper practice, it "is a baseless dream,
invented only to avoid the necessity of saying that Judges make the
Law to hold that (prior to the decisions) there was a custom that
future contingent interests were indestructible."
Custom is another of the sources of the Law. It is not the only
source, as the late Mr. James C. Carter would have us believe, but
is only one of the sources. Its chief function is in the sphere of interpretation of contracts, and in negligence cases where the test is
whether a certain person has acted as a reasonable man.
In the absence of statutes, judicial precedent, opinions of experts,
and custom, the source from which the courts draw their rules is
morality and equity. For it is generally conceded that a court is
never authorized to refuse to pass upon a case, because there is no
person, book, or custom to tell it how to decide it.
The whole book, it will be found, is hinged on this idea: that the
Law of a state is composed of the rules which the courts lay down
for the determination of legal rights and duties. To Austin, he
says, we are indebted for clearly pointing out that the Law is something that actually exists, not something that ought to exist. Austin,
however, found in statutes of the state the typical Law, and his aim
was to bring non-statute Law within this type; this he accomplished by
the fiction that what the sovereign permits he commands. Professor
Gray, on the other hand, says that statutes are merely a source of the
Law, until interpreted by the courts.
In the chapters on the Law, Judicial Precedents and Custom, Professor Gray't views come in conflict with the theory of Law so ably
set forth by the late Mr. James C. Carter ("Law: Its Origin, Growth
and Function").
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Mr. Carter's book, as Professor Gray himself points out, appears
to be the result of his opposition to the adoption of Mr. David Dudley
Field's "Civil Code in New York." His analysis was probably in the
first instance to show that the Law is not a set of arbitrary, inflexible
rules, but that the Law differs with every generation and that, therefore, the idea of a Code of the substantive Laws is fundamentally
wrong.
Carter's conception of substantive Law was expressed in terms of
custom. A new set of circumstances arising would be decided by broad
rules of conduct.
Professor Gray, on the other hand, would say that those cases
where no universal conduct or practice (and no statute, judicial precedent or opinion of experts) exists are decided on principles of morality
and equity. To call these principles custom, he would say, is inaccurate
because custom is conduct or practice. The rule allowing three days'
grace on bills of exchange was based originally on custom, but the rule
in Shelley's Case was based on morality, which in this case would
be public policy.
It must be admitted that, however great may be our appreciation
of Mr. Carter's view, Professor Gray has presented us with a more
accurate and satisfying analysis.
This little book, like everything else from Professor Gray's pen, is
a carefully written, clearly expressed account of the result of much
searching thought on the subjects considered.
The occasion of the publication of his views was the Carpentier
lectures at Columbia University in i9o8.

PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS FOR DRAWING WILLS AND THE SETTLEMENT OF
ESTATES IN PENNSYLVANIA. By John Marshall Gest of the Philadel-

phia Bar.
This book presents for consideration a concise and accurate compendium of the practical as well as legal questions encountered in that
branch of a lawyer's work indicated by the title.
The section on Drawing of Wills was published in THE AmERIcAN
LAW REGISTER for November, 1907, and the lectures upon which the
book is based were delivered to the students of the Law Department
of the University of Pennsylvania.
The author shows not only great research among the authorities,
and decisions relative to his subjects, but has instilled a quaint current
of humor into his work that makes the volume not only valuable to the
active practitioner, but readable even to the layman-a quality possessed
by few legal treatises.
If technical books could all be written in the breezy style which characterizes Mr. Gest's lectures the student would smilingly burn the midnight oil until he had read and digested the last syllable. An easy task
for humor aids digestion.
The wide field of first drafting a will in accordance with a testator's
intentions and then accomplishing the execution thereof under the law
is fully traversed by the author and the invaluable suggestions put forth
show the result of study along practical lines together with close observation of human nature and a no mean ability in communicating this
knowledge in an attractive form.
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The citations from leading cases and the references to the statutes
are mingled with apt quotations from both ancient and modem writers
legal and literary; the musty law volume and the popular novel have
each supplied illustrations both sage and humorous. In short, this is
a practical, comprehensive guide and an able treatise. A book that cannot gather dust on the shelves-of assistance to the lawyer and if read
by those outside of the profession points clearly the wisdom of Seneca's
words: "We sought therefore to amend our will and not to suffer it
through despite to languish long time in error:' and refutes the sentiments of Othello, "The bloody book of law you shall read in the bitter
letter after your own sense."
The closing sentences of advice to students of law give sound admonition presented in such form as makes the humor irresistible.
The author's preface, in explaining that "Ours is an occupation that
dries the blood" recalls the sentiment of Horace, "Dulce est desipere in
loco," and the reader will heartily agree in Latin verse,
"qui miscuit utile dulci
Lectorem delectando pariterque monendo."
L. I. R.

